Abstract. We present a new, distributed method to compute approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous approaches that analyze the two payoff matrices at the same time (for example, by solving a single LP that combines the two players payoffs), our algorithm first solves two independent LPs, each of which is derived from one of the two payoff matrices, and then compute approximate Nash equilibria using only limited communication between the players. Our method has several applications for improved bounds for efficient computations of approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. First, it yields a best polynomial-time algorithm for computing approximate wellsupported Nash equilibria (WSNE), which guarantees to find a 0.6528-WSNE in polynomial time. Furthermore, since our algorithm solves the two LPs separately, it can be used to improve upon the best known algorithms in the limited communication setting: the algorithm can be implemented to obtain a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses poly-logarithmic communication and finds a 0.6528-WSNE. The algorithm can also be carried out to beat the best known bound in the query complexity setting, requiring O(n log n) payoff queries to compute a 0.6528-WSNE. Finally, our approach can also be adapted to provide the best known communication efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria: it uses poly-logarithmic communication to find a 0.382-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
The problem of finding equilibria in non-cooperative games is a central problem in modern game theory. Nash's seminal theorem proved that every finite normalform game has at least one Nash equilibrium [15] , and this raises the natural question of whether we can find one efficiently. After several years of extensive research, this study has culminated in a proof that finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete [4] even for two-player bimatrix games [2] , which is considered to be strong evidence that there is no polynomial-time algorithm for this problem.
Approximate equilibria. The fact that computing an exact Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is unlikely to be tractable, has led to the study of approximate Query complexity. The payoff query model is motivated by practical applications of game theory. It is often the case that we know that there is a game to be solved, but we do not know what the payoffs are, and in order to discover the payoffs, we would have to play the game. This may be quite costly, so it is natural to ask whether we can find an equilibrium of a game while minimising the number of experiments that we must perform.
Payoff queries model this situation. In the payoff query model we are told the structure of the game, ie. the strategy space, but we are not told the payoffs. We can then make payoff queries, where we propose a pure strategy profile, and we are told the payoff to each player under that strategy profile. Our task is to compute an equilibrium of the game while minimising the number of payoff queries that we make.
The study of query complexity in bimatrix games was initiated by Fearnley et al. [7] , who gave a deterministic algorithm for finding a 1 2 -NE using 2n − 1 payoff queries. A subsequent paper of Fearnley and Savani [9] showed a number of further results. Firstly, they showed a Ω(n 2 ) lower bound on the query complexity of finding an ǫ-NE with ǫ < 1 2 , which combined with the result above, gives a complete view of the deterministic query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. They then give a randomized algorithm that finds a ( Our contribution. In this paper we introduce a distributed technique that allows us to efficiently compute approximate Nash equilibria and approximate well-supported Nash equilibria using limited communication between the players.
Traditional methods for computing WSNEs have used an LP based approach that, when used on a bimatrix game (R, C), solve the zero-sum game (R−C, C − R). The KS algorithm [14] showed that if there is no pure 2 3 -WSNE, then the solution to the zero-sum game is a 2 3 -WSNE. The slight improvement of the FGSS-algorithm [8] to 0.6608 was obtained by adding two further methods to the KS algorithm: if the KS algorithm does not produce a 0.6608-WSNE, then either there is a 2 × 2 matching pennies sub-game that is 0.6608-WSNE or the strategies from the zero-sum game can be improved by shifting the probabilities of both players within their supports in order to produce a 0.6608-WSNE.
In this paper, we take a different approach. We first show that the bound of 2 3 can be matched using a pair of distributed LPs. Given a bimatrix game (R, C), we solve the two zero-sum games (R, −R), and (−C, C), and we give a straightforward procedure that we call the base algorithm, which uses the solutions to these games to produce a 2 3 -WSNE of (R, C). Goldberg and Pastink [11] also considered this pair of LPs, but their algorithm only produces a 0.732-WSNE. We then show that the base algorithm can be improved by applying the probability-shifting and matching-pennies ideas from the FGSS-algorithm. That is, if the base algorithm fails to find a 0.6528-WSNE, then a 0.6528-WSNE can be obtained either by shifting the probabilities of one of the two players, or by identifying a 2 × 2 sub-game. This gives a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a 0.6528-WSNE, which provides the best known approximate guarantees for WSNEs (Theorem 2).
It is worth pointing out that, while these techniques are thematically similar to the ones used by the FGSS-algorithm, the actual implementation is significantly different. The FGSS-algorithm attempts to improve the strategies by shifting probabilities within the supports of the strategies returned by the two player game, with the goal of reducing the other player's payoff. In our algorithm, we shift probabilities away from bad strategies in order to improve that player's payoff. This type of analysis is possible because the base algorithm produces a strategy profile in which one of the two players plays a pure strategy, which makes the analysis we need to carry out much simpler. On the other hand, the KS-algorithm can produce strategies in which both players play many strategies, and so the analysis used for the FGSS-algorithm is necessarily more complicated.
Since our algorithm solves the two LPs separately, it can be used to improve the upon the best known algorithms in the limited communication setting. This is because no communication is required for the row player to solve (R, −R), and the column player to solve (−C, C). The players can then carry out the rest of the algorithm using only poly-logarithmic communication. Hence, we obtain a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses poly-logarithmic communication and finds a 0.6528-WSNE (Theorem 3). Moreover, the base algorithm can be implemented as a communication efficient algorithm for finding a (0.5 + ǫ)-WSNE in a win-lose bimatrix game, where all payoffs are either 0 or 1 (Theorem 1).
The algorithm can also used to beat the best known bound in the query complexity setting. It has already been shown by Goldberg and Roth [12] that an ǫ-NE of a zero-sum game can be found by a randomized algorithm that uses O( n log n ǫ 2 ) payoff queries. Since rest of the steps used by our algorithm can also be carried out using O(n log n) payoff queries, this gives us a query efficient algorithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE (Theorem 4).
We also show that the base algorithm can be adapted to find a
2 -NE in a bimatrix game, which matches the bound given for the first algorithm of Bosse et al. [1] . Once again, this can be implemented in a communication efficient manner, and so we obtain an algorithm that computes a (
+ ǫ)-NE (i.e., 0.382-NE) using only poly-logarithmic communication (Theorem 5).
Preliminaries
Bimatrix games. Throughout the paper, we use [n] to denote the set of integers {1, 2, . . . , n}. An n × n bimatrix game is a pair (R, C) of two n × n matrices: R gives payoffs for the row player, and C gives the payoffs for the column player. We make the standard assumption that all payoffs lie in the range [0, 1]. We also assume that each payoff has constant bit-length. A win-lose bimatrix game is a game in which all payoffs are either 0 or 1.
Each player has n pure strategies. To play the game, both players simultaneously select a pure strategy: the row player selects a row i ∈ [n], and the column player selects a column j ∈ [n]. The row player then receives payoff R i,j , and the column player receives payoff C i,j .
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over [n] . We denote a mixed strategy for the row player as a vector x of length n, such that x i is the probability that the row player assigns to pure strategy i. A mixed strategy of the column player is a vector y of length n, with the same interpretation. Given a mixed strategy x for either player, the support of x is the set of pure strategies i with x i > 0. If x and y are mixed strategies for the row and the column player, respectively, then we call (x, y) a mixed strategy profile. The expected payoff for the row player under strategy profile (x, y) is given by x T Ry and for the column player by x T Cy. We denote the support of a strategy x as supp(x), which gives the set of pure strategies i such that x i > 0.
Nash equilibria. Let y be a mixed strategy for the column player. The set of pure best responses against y for the row player is the set of pure strategies that maximize the payoff against y. More formally, a pure strategy i ∈ [n] is a best response against y if, for all pure strategies i ′ ∈ [n] we have:
Column player best responses are defined analogously. A mixed strategy profile (x, y) is a mixed Nash equilibrium if every pure strategy in supp(x) is a best response against y, and every pure strategy in supp(y) is a best response against x. Nash [15] showed that all bimatrix games have a mixed Nash equilibrium. Observe that in a Nash equilibrium, each player's expected payoff is equal to their best response payoff.
Approximate Equilibria. There are two commonly studied notions of approximate equilibrium, and we consider both of them in this paper. The first notion is of an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium (ǫ-NE), which weakens the requirement that a player's expected payoff should be equal to their best response payoff. Formally, given a strategy profile (x, y), we define the regret suffered by the row player to be the difference between the best response payoff, and the actual payoff: max
Regret for the column player is defined analogously. We have that (x, y) is an ǫ-NE if and only if both players have regret less than or equal to ǫ. The other notion is of an ǫ-approximate-well-supported equilibrium (ǫ-WSNE), which weakens the requirement that players only place probability on best response strategies. Given a strategy profile (x, y) and a pure strategy j ∈ [n], we say that j is an ǫ-best-response for the row player if:
An ǫ-WSNE requires that both players only place probability on ǫ-best-responses. Formally, the row player's pure strategy regret under (x, y) is defined to be:
Pure strategy regret for the column player is defined analogously. A strategy profile (x, y) is an ǫ-WSNE if both players have pure strategy regret less than or equal to ǫ.
Communication complexity. We consider the communication model for bimatrix games introduced by Goldberg and Pastink [11] . In this model, both players know the payoffs in their own payoff matrix, but do not know the payoffs in their opponent's matrix. The players then follow an algorithm that uses a number of communication rounds, where in each round they exchange a single bit of information. Between each communication round, the players are permitted to perform arbitrary randomized computations (although it should be noted that, in this paper, the players will only perform polynomial-time computations) using their payoff matrix, and the bits that they have received so far. At the end of the algorithm, the row player outputs a mixed strategy x, and the column player outputs a mixed strategy y.
The goal is to produce a strategy profile (x, y) that is an ǫ-NE or ǫ-WSNE for a sufficiently small ǫ while limiting the number of communication rounds used by the algorithm. The algorithms given in this paper will use at most O(log 2 n) communication rounds. In order to achieve this, we use the following result of Goldberg and Pastink [11] .
Lemma 1 ( [11]
). Given a mixed strategy x for the row-player and an ǫ > 0, there is a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses O( 
The algorithm uses the well-known sampling technique of Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta to construct the strategy x s , so for this reason we will call the strategy x s the sampled strategy from x. Since this strategy has a logarithmically sized support, it can be transmitted by sending O( log n ǫ 2 ) strategy indexes, each of which can be represented using log n bits. By symmetry, the algorithm can obviously also be used to transmit approximations of column player strategies to the row player.
Query complexity. In the query complexity setting, the algorithm knows that the players will play an n×n game (R, C), but it does not know any of the entries of R or C. These payoffs are obtained using payoff queries in which the algorithm proposes a pure strategy profile (i, j), and then it is told the value of R ij and C ij . After each payoff query, the algorithm can make arbitrary computations (although, again, in this paper the algorithms that we consider take polynomial time) in order to decide the next pure strategy profile to query. After making a sequence of payoff queries, the algorithm then outputs a mixed strategy profile (x, y). Again, the goal is to ensure that this strategy profile is an ǫ-NE or ǫ-WSNE, while minimizing the number of queries made overall.
There are two results that we will use for this setting. Goldberg and Roth [10] have given a randomized algorithm that, with high probability, finds an ǫ-NE of a zero-sum game using O( n·log n ǫ 2 ) payoff queries. Given a mixed strategy profile (x, y), an ǫ-approximate payoff vector for the row player is a vector v such that, for all i ∈ [n] we have |v i − (R · y) i | ≤ ǫ. Approximate payoff vectors for the column player are defined symmetrically. Fearnley and Savani [9] observed that there is a randomized algorithm that when given the strategy profile (x, y), finds approximate payoff vectors for both players using O( n·log n ǫ 2 ) payoff queries and that succeeds with high probability. We summarise these two results in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ( [9, 10] ). Given an n × n zero-sum bimatrix game, with probability at least (1 − n
2 , we can compute an ǫ-Nash equilibrium (x, y), and ǫ-approximate payoff vectors for both players under (x, y), using O( n·log n ǫ 2 ) payoff queries.
The base algorithm
In this section, we introduce an algorithm that we call the base algorithm. This algorithm provides a simple way to find a 2 3 -WSNE. We present this algorithm separately for three reasons. Firstly, we believe that the algorithm is interesting in its own right, since it provides a relatively straightforward method for finding a
2
The algorithm. Consider the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R, −R) and (−C, C).
-Let (x * , y * ) be a NE of (R, −R), and let (x,ŷ) be a NE of (C, −C).
-Let v r be the value secured by x * in (R, −R), and let v c be the value secured byŷ in (−C, C). Without loss of generality assume
-Let j * be a pure best response to x * . -Find a row i such that R ij * > 1/3 and
We argue that this algorithm is correct. Firstly, we must prove that the row i used in Step 4 actually exists, which we do in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If Algorithm 1 reaches Step 4, then there exists a row i such that R ij * > 1/3 and C ij * > 1/3.
Proof. Let i be a row sampled from x * . We will show that there is a positive probability that row i satisfies the desired properties.
We begin by showing that the probability that Pr(
. Thus, applying Markov's inequality we obtain:
3 ) we can therefore conclude that Pr(R ij * ≤ 1 3 ) < 0.5. The exact same technique can be used to prove that Pr(C ij * ≤ 1 3 ) < 0.5, by using the fact that C
. We can now apply the union bound to argue that:
Hence, there is positive probability that row i satisfies R ij * > 1 3 and C ij * > 1 3 , so such a row must exist.
⊓ ⊔
We now argue that the algorithm always produces a 2 3 -WSNE. There are three possible strategy profiles that can be returned by the algorithm, which we consider individually.
Step 2. Since v c ≤ v r by assumption, and since v r ≤ Step 3. Much like in the previous case, when the column player plays y * , the row player can have pure strategy regret at most Win-lose games. The base algorithm can be adapted to provide a communication efficient method for finding a (0.5 + ǫ)-WSNE in win-lose games. In brief, the algorithm can be modified to find a 0.5-WSNE in a win-lose game by making Steps 2 and 3 check against the threshold of 0.5. It can then be shown that if these steps fail, then there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in column j * . This can then be implemented as a communication efficient protocol using the algorithm from Lemma 1. Full details are given in Appendix A, where the following theorem is proved. 
An algorithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE
In this section, we show how Algorithm 1 can be modified to produce a 0.6528-WSNE. We begin by giving an overview of the techniques used, we then give the algorithm, and finally we analyse the quality of WSNE that it produces.
Outline. The idea behind our algorithm is to replace Step 4 of Algorithm 1 with a more involved procedure. This procedure uses two techniques, that both find an ǫ-WSNE with ǫ < Firstly, we attempt to turn (x * , j * ) into a WSNE by shifting probabilities. Observe that, since j * is a best response, the column player has a pure strategy regret of 0 in (x * , j * ). On the other hand, we have no guarantees about the row player since x * might place a small amount of probability strategies with payoff strictly less than 1 3 . However, since x * achieves a high expected payoff (due to Step 2,) it cannot place too much probability on these low payoff strategies. Thus, the idea is to shift the probability that x * assigns to entries of j * with payoff less than or equal to 1 3 to entries with payoff strictly greater than 1 3 , and thus ensure that the row player's pure strategy regret is below 2 3 . Of course, this procedure will increase the pure strategy regret of the column player, but if it is also below 2 3 once all probability has been shifted, then we have found an ǫ-WSNE with ǫ < If shifting probabilities fails to find an ǫ-WSNE with ǫ < 2 3 , then we show that the game contains a matching pennies sub-game. More precisely, we show that there exists a column j ′ , and rows b and s such that the 2 × 2 sub-game induced by j * , j ′ , b, and s has the following form:
Thus, if both players play uniformly over their respective pair of strategies, then j * , j ′ , b, and s with have payoff ≈ 0.5, and so this yields an ǫ-WSNE with ǫ <
The algorithm. We now formalize this approach, and show that it always finds an ǫ-WSNE with ǫ < 2 3 . In order to quantify the precise ǫ that we obtain, we parametrise the algorithm by a variable z, which we constrain to be in the range 0 ≤ z < 1 24 . With the exception of the matching pennies step, all other steps of the algorithm will return a ( 2 3 − z)-WSNE, while the matching pennies step will return a ( The algorithm is displayed as Algorithm 2. Observe that Steps 1, 2, and 3 are versions of the corresponding steps from Algorithm 1, which have been adapted to produce a (
Step 4 implements the probability shifting procedure, while Step 5 finds a matching pennies sub-game.
Observe that the probabilities used in x mp and y mp are only well defined when z ≤ The correctness of Step 5. This step of the algorithm relies on the existence of the rows b and s, which is not at all trivial. This is shown in the following lemma. The proof of this lemma is quite lengthy, and is given in full detail in Appendix B.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the following three conditions hold:
1. x * has payoff at least
Then, both of the following are true:
The lemma explicitly states the preconditions that need to hold because we will reuse it in our communication complexity and query complexity results. Observe that the preconditions are indeed true if the Algorithm reaches Step 5. The first and third conditions hold because, due to Step 2, we know that x * is a min-max strategy that secures payoff at least v r > 2 3 − z. The second condition holds because Step 3 ensures that the column player's best response payoff is at least 2 3 − z. The fourth condition holds because Step 5 explicitly checks for these pure strategy profiles.
Overview of the proof of Lemma 4. We now give an overview of the ideas used in the proof. The majority of the proof is dedicated to proving four facts, which we outline below. First we determine the structure of the row j * . Here we use the fact that in (x * , j * ) both players have expected payoff close to -Let (x * , y * ) be a NE of (R, −R), and let (x,ŷ) be a NE of (C, −C).
-Let vr be the value secured by x * in (R, −R), and let vc be the value secured byŷ in (−C, C). Without loss of generality assume that vc ≤ vr.
If vr
≤ 2/3 − z, then return (x, y * ). 3. If for all j ∈ [n] it holds that C T j x * ≤ 2/3 − z, then return (x * , y * ).
Otherwise:
-Let j * be a pure best response against x * . Define:
-Define the strategy x b as follows. For each i ∈ [n] we have:
otherwise.
5. Otherwise: -Let j ′ be a pure best response against x b .
-If there exists an i ∈ supp(x * ) such that (i, j * ) or (i, j ′ ) is a pure ( .
-Define the row player strategy xmp and the column player strategy ymp as follows. For each i ∈ [n] we have:
-Return (xmp, ymp).
1. Most of the probability assigned to B is placed on rows i with R ij * ≈ 1 and
Most of the probability assigned to S is placed on rows i with R ij * ≈ 1 3 and C ij * ≈ 1.
Moreover, x * must assign roughly half of its probability to rows in B and half of its probability to rows in S.
Next, we observe that since Step 4 failed to produce a ( 2 3 − z)-WSNE, it must be the case that j * is not a ( 
For the fourth fact, we recall that x * is a min-max strategy that guarantees payoff at least v r > 2 3 − z, so the payoff of x * against j ′ must be at least 2 3 − z. However, since most rows i ∈ B have R ij ′ < 1 3 + z, and since x * places roughly half its probability on B, it must be the case that most row player payoffs in S are close to 1. This gives us our final fact.
4. Most of the probability assigned to S is placed on rows i with R ij ′ ≈ 1.
Our four facts only describe the expected payoff of the rows in B and S for the columns j * and j ′ . The final step of the proof is to pick out two particular rows that satisfy the desired properties. For the row b we use Facts 1 and 3, observing that if most of the probability assigned to B is placed on rows i with R ij * ≈ 1, and on rows i with C ij * ≈ 1, then it must be the case that both of these conditions can be simultaneously satisfied by a single row b. The existence of s is proved by the same argument using Facts 2 and 4.
Quality of approximation. We now analyse the quality of WSNE that our algorithm produces. Steps 2, 3, 4, 5 each return a strategy profile. Observe that Steps 2 and 3 are the same as the respective steps in the base algorithm, but with the threshold changed from 2 3 to 2 3 − z. Hence, we can use the same reasoning as we gave for the base algorithm to argue that these steps always return ( Step 4. By definition all rows r ∈ B satisfy R ij * ≥ 1 3 +z, so since supp(x b ) ⊆ B, the pure strategy regret of the row player can be at most 1 − (
For the same reason, since (x b T · C) j * ≥ 1 3 + z holds, the pure strategy regret of the column player can also be at Step 5. Since R bj * > 1 − 18z 1+3z , the payoff of b when the column player plays y mp is at least:
1+3z , the payoff of s when the column player plays y mp is at least:
In the same way, one can show that the payoffs of j * and j ′ are also 2−33z−117z 2 )-WSNE. To find the optimal value for z, we need to find the largest value of z for which the following inequality holds.
Setting the inequality to an equality and rearranging gives the following cubic polynomial equation.
Since the discriminant of this polynomial is positive, this polynomial has three real roots, which can be found via the trigonometric method. Only one of these roots lies in the range 0 ≤ z < 1 24 , which is the following:
Thus, we get z ≈ 0.013906376, and so we have found an algorithm that always produces a 0.6528-WSNE. So we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2.
There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given a bimatrix game, finds a 0.6528-WSNE.
Communication complexity. We claim that our algorithm can be adapted for the limited communication setting. We make the following modification to our algorithm. After computing x * , y * ,x, andŷ, we then use Lemma 1 to construct and communicate the sampled strategies x * s , y * s ,x s , andŷ s . These strategies are communicated between the two players using 4 · (log n) 2 bits of communication, and the players also exchange v r = (x * s )
T · Ry * s and v c =x T s Cŷ s using log n rounds of communication. The algorithm then continues as before, except the sampled strategies are used in place of their non-sampled counterparts. Finally, in Steps 2 and 3, we test against the threshold
Observe that, when sampled strategies are used, all steps of the algorithm can be carried out in at most (log n) 2 communication. In particular, to implement Step 4, the column player can communicate j * to the row player, and then the row player can communicate R ij * for all rows i ∈ supp(x * s ) using (log n) 2 bits of communication, which allows the column player to determine j ′ . Once j ′ has been determined, there are only 2 · log n payoffs in each matrix that are relevant to the algorithm (the payoffs in rows i ∈ supp(x * s ) in columns j * and j ′ ,) and so the two players can communicate all of these payoffs to each other, and then no further communication is necessary. Now, we must argue that this modified algorithm is correct. Firstly, we argue that if the modified algorithm reaches Step 5, then the rows b and s exist. To do this, we observe that the required preconditions of Lemma 4 are satisfied by x * s , j * , and j ′ . Condition 2 holds because the modified Step 3 ensures that the column player's best response payoff is at least is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game (R, −R). The following lemma shows that any approximate Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game behaves like an approximate min-max strategy.
Lemma 5.
If (x, y) is an ǫ-NE of a zero-sum game (M, −M ), then for every strategy y ′ we have:
Proof. Let v = x T · M · y be the payoff to the row player under (x, y). Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a column player strategy y ′ such that:
Since the game is zero-sum, this implies that the column player's payoff under (x, y ′ ) is strictly larger than −v + ǫ, which then directly implies that the best response payoff for the column player against x is strictly larger than −v + ǫ. However, since the column player's expected payoff under (x, y) is −v, this then implies that (x, y) is not an ǫ-NE, which provides our contradiction. ⊓ ⊔
Since
Step 2 implies that the row player's payoff in (x * , y * ) is at least Finally, we argue that the algorithm finds a (0.6528+ǫ). The modified Steps 2 and 3 now return a ( 2 3 − z + ǫ)-WSNE, whereas the approximation guarantees of the other steps are unchanged. Thus, we can reuse our original analysis to obtain the following theorem. Query complexity. We now show that Algorithm 2 can be implemented in a payoff-query efficient manner. Let ǫ > 0 be a positive constant. We now outline the changes needed in the algorithm.
-In Step 1 we use the algorithm of Lemma 2 to find ǫ 2 -NEs of (R, −R), and (C, −C). We denote the mixed strategies found as (x * a , y * a ) and (x a ,ŷ a ), respectively, and we use these strategies in place of their original counterparts throughout the rest of the algorithm. We also compute ǫ 2 -approximate payoff vectors for each of these strategies, and use them whenever we need to know the payoff of a particular strategy under one of these strategies. In particular, we set v r to be the payoff of x * a according to the approximate payoff vector of y * a , and we set v c to be the payoff ofŷ a according to the approximate payoff vector forx a .
-In Steps 2 and 3 we test against the threshold of
Step 4 we select j * to be the column that is maximal in the approximate payoff vector against x * a . We then spend n payoff queries to query every row in column j * , which allow us to proceed with the rest of this step as before. -In Step 5 we use the algorithm of Lemma 2 to find an approximate payoff vector v for the column player against x b . We then select j ′ to be a column that maximizes v, and then spend n payoff queries to query every row in j * , which allows us to proceed with the rest of this step as before.
Observe that the query complexity of the algorithm is O( n·log n ǫ 2 ), where the dominating term arises due to the use of the algorithm from Lemma 2 to approximate solutions to the zero-sum games.
We now argue that this modified algorithm produces a (0.6528 + ǫ)-WSNE. Firstly, we need to reestablish the existence of the rows b and s used in Step 5. To do this, we observe that the preconditions of Lemma 4 hold for x * a . We start with Conditions 1 and 3. Note that the payoff for the row player under (x * a , y * a ) is at least v r − ǫ 2 (since v r was estimated with approximate payoff vectors,) and Step 2 ensures that v r > 2 3 − z + ǫ. Hence, we can apply Lemma 5 to argue that x * a secures payoff at least 2 3 − z against every strategy of the column player, which proves that Conditions 1 and 3 hold. Condition 2 holds because the check in Step 3, ensures that the approximate payoff of j * against x * is at least 2 3 − z + ǫ, and therefore the actual payoff of of j * against x * is at least Steps 2 and 3 in the modified algorithm return a ( 2 3 − z + ǫ)-WSNE, while the other steps provided the same approximation guarantee as the original algorithm. So, we can reuse the analysis for the original algorithm to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.
There is a randomized algorithm that, with high probability, finds a (0.6528 + ǫ)-WSNE using O( n·log n ǫ 2 ) payoff queries.
A communication efficient algorithm for finding a
The algorithm. We will study the following algorithm.
Algorithm 3
2 , return (x, y * ).
Otherwise:
-Let j be a best response for the column player against x * . -Let r be a best response for the row player against j.
-Define the strategy profile
We show that this algorithm always produces a
2 -NE. We start by considering the strategy profile returned by Step 3. The maximum payoff that the row player can achieve against y * is v r , so the row player's regret can be at most v r . Similarly, the maximum payoff that the column layer can achieve againstx is v c ≤ v r , so the column player's regret can be at most v r .
Step 3 only returns a strategy profile in the case where v r ≤ 3− √ 5
2 , so this step always produces a
To analyse the quality of approximate equilibrium found by Step 2, we use the following Lemma.
Lemma 6. The strategy profile (x ′ , j) is a 1−vr 2−vr -NE. Proof. We start by analysing the regret of the row player. By definition, row r is a best response against column j. So, the regret of the row player can be expressed as:
where in the first inequality we use the fact that x * is a min-max strategy that secures payoff at least v r , and the second inequality uses the fact that R rj ≤ 1.
We now analyse the regret of the column player. Let c be a best response for the column player against x ′ . The regret of the column player can be expressed as:
The first inequality holds since j is a best response against x * , and therefore
Step 2 is only triggered in the case where v r > 3− √ 5
2 , and we have that Communication complexity. We now argue that, for every ǫ > 0 the algorithm can be used to find a
We begin by considering Step 3. Obviously, the zero-sum games can be solved by the two players independently without any communication. Then, the players exchange v r and v c using O(log n) rounds of communication. If both v r and v c are smaller than
2 , then the algorithm from Lemma 1 is applied to communicatê x s to the row player, and y * s to the column player. Since the payoffs under the sampled strategies are within ǫ of the originals, we have that (x s , y * s ) is a
If the algorithm reaches Step 2, then the row player uses the algorithm of Lemma 1 to communicate x * s to the column player. The column player then computes a best response j s against x * s , and uses log n communication rounds to transmit it to the row player. The row player then computes a best response r s against j s , then computes: x In the game (R, −R), the unique Nash equilibrium is (b, l), which can be found by iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Similarly, in the game (−C, C), the unique Nash equilibrium is (b, r), which can again be found by elimination of dominated strategies. Note, however, that the game itself does not contain any dominated strategies. Hence, we have
Step 2 is triggered, and the resulting strategy profile is (b, l). Under this strategy profile, the column player receives payoff 0, while the best response payoff to the column player is 2 3 , so this is a 2 3 -WSNE and no better. This lower bound can be modified to work against our algorithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE by changing both 2 3 payoffs to 0.6528. Then, by the same reasoning given above, Step 2 is triggered, and the algorithm returns a 0.6528-WSNE.
A A communication efficient algorithm for finding a 0.5-WSNE in a win-lose bimatrix game (proof of Theorem 1)
We will study the following simple modification of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 4
-Let j * be a pure best response to x * . -Find a row i such that R ij * = 1 and C ij = 1.
We will show that this algorithm always finds a 0.5-WSNE in a win-lose game. Firstly, we show that the pure Nash equilibrium found in Step 4 always exists. The following lemma is similar to Lemma 3, but exploits the fact that the game is win-lose to obtain a stronger conclusion.
Lemma 7.
If Algorithm 4 is applied to a win-lose game, and it reaches Step 4, then then there exists a row i ∈ supp(x * ) such that R ij * = 1 and C ij * = 1.
We begin by showing that the probability that Pr(R ij * = 0) < 0.5. Let the random variable T = 1 − R ij * . Since v r > 1 2 , we have that E[T ] < 0.5. Thus, applying Markov's inequality we obtain:
Since Pr(R ij * = 0) = Pr(T ≥ 1) we can therefore conclude that Pr(R ij * = 0) < 0.5. The exact same technique can be used to prove that Pr(C ij * = 0) < 0.5, by using the fact that C T j * · x * > 0.5. We can now apply the union bound to argue that:
Hence, there is positive probability that row i satisfies R ij * > 0 and C ij * > 0, so such a row must exist. The final step is to observe that, since the game is win-lose, we have that R ij * > 0 implies R ij * = 1, and that C ij * > 0 implies C ij * = 1.
⊓ ⊔
We now prove that the algorithm always finds a 0.5-WSNE. The reasoning is very similar to the analysis of the base algorithm. The strategy profiles returned by Steps 2 and 3 are 0.5-WSNEs by the same reasoning that was given for the base algorithm.
Step 4 always returns a pure Nash equilibrium.
Communication complexity. We now show that Algorithm 4 can be implemented in a communication efficient way.
The zero-sum games in Step 1 can be solved by the two players independently without any communication. Then, the players exchange v r and v s using O(log n) rounds of communication. If both v r and v s are smaller than 0.5, then the algorithm from Lemma 1 is applied to communicatex s to the row player, and y * s to the column player. Since the payoffs under the sampled strategies are within ǫ of the originals, we have that all pure strategies have payoff less than or equal to 0.5 + ǫ under (x s , y * s ), so this strategy profile is a (0.5 + ǫ)-WSNE. We will assume from now on that v r > v c . If the algorithm reaches Step 3, then the row player uses the algorithm of Lemma 1 to communicate x * s to the column player. The column player then computes a best response j * s against x * s , and checks whether the payoff of j * s against x * s is less than or equal to 0.5 + ǫ. If so, then the players output (x * s , j * s ), which is a 0.5 + ǫ-WSNE Otherwise, we claim that there is a pure strategy i ∈ supp(x * s ) such that (i, j * s ) is a pure Nash equilibrium. This can be shown by observing that the expected payoff of x * s against j * s is at least 0.5 − ǫ, while the expected payoff of j * s against x * s is at least 0.5 + ǫ. Repeating the proof of Lemma 7 using these inequalities then shows that the pure Nash equilibrium does indeed exist. Since supp(x * s ) has logarithmic size, the row player can simply transmit to the column player all payoffs R ij * s for which i ∈ supp(x * s ), and the column player can then send back a row corresponding to a pure Nash equilibrium.
In conclusion, we have shown that a (0.5 + ǫ)-WSNE can be found in randomized expected-polynomial-time using O log 2 n ǫ 2 communication, which completes the proof of Theorem 1.
B Proof of Lemma 4
In this section we assume that Steps 1 through 4 of our algorithm did not return a ( 2 3 − z)-WSNE, and that neither j * nor j ′ contained a pure ( 2 3 − z)-WSNE. We show that, under these assumptions, the rows b and s required by Step 5 do indeed exist.
Probability bounds. We begin by proving bounds on the amount of probability that x * can place on S and B. The following lemma uses the fact that x * secures an expected payoff of at least 2 3 − z to give an upper bound on the amount of probability that x * can place on S. To simplify notation, we use Pr(B) to denote the probability assigned by x * to the rows in B, and we use Pr(S) to denote the probability assigned by x * to the rows in S.
Lemma 8. Pr(S) ≤ 1+3z 2−3z . Proof. We will prove our claim using Markov's inequality. Consider the random variable T = 1 − R ij * where i is sampled from x * . Since by our assumption the expected payoff of the row player is greater than 2/3 − z we get that E(T ) ≤ 1/3 + z. If we apply Markov's inequality we get
which is the claimed result.
⊓ ⊔
Next we show an upper bound on Pr(B). Here we use the fact that j * does not contain a ( 2 3 − z)-WSNE to argue that all column player payoffs in B are smaller than 1 3 + z. Since we know that the payoff of j * against x * is at least 2 3 − z, this can be used to prove a upper bound on the amount of probability that x * assigns to B.
Lemma 9. Pr(B) ≤ 1+3z 2−3z . Proof. Since there is no i ∈ supp(x * ) such that (i, j * ) is a pure ( 2 3 − z)-WSNE , and since each row i ∈ B satisfies R ij * ≥ 1 3 + z, we must have that C ij * < 1 3 + z for every i ∈ B. By assumption we know that C T j * x * > 2/3 − z. So, we have the following inequality:
Solving this inequality for Pr(B) gives the desired result.
Payoff inequalities for j * . We now show properties about the average payoff obtained from the rows in B and S. Recall that x b was defined in Step 4 of our algorithm, and that it denotes the normalization of the probability mass assigned by x * to rows in B. The following lemma shows that the expected payoff to the row player in the strategy profile (x b , j * ) is close to 1.
1+3z . Proof. By definition we have that:
We begin by deriving a lower bound for i∈B x * i · R ij * . Using the fact that x * secures an expected payoff of at least 2/3 − z against j * and then applying the bound from Lemma 8 gives:
Hence we can conclude that:
Substituting this into Equation (1), along with the upper bound on Pr(B) from Lemma 9, allows us to conclude that:
Next we would like to show a similar bound on the expected payoff to the column player of the rows in S. To do this, we define x s to be the normalisation of the probability mass that x * assigns to the rows in S. More formally, for each i ∈ [n], we define:
The next lemma shows that the expected payoff to the column player in the profile (x s , j * ) is close to 1.
Proof. By definition we have that:
We begin by deriving a lower bound for i∈S x * i · C ij * . By assumption, we know that C T j * x * > 2/3 − z. Moreover, since j * does not contain a ( 2 3 − z)-WSNE we have that all rows i in B satisfy C ij * < 1/3 − z. If we combine these facts that with Lemma 9 we obtain:
The only remaining inequality that we require is a lower bound on the expected payoff to the row player in the profile (x s , j ′ ). However, before we can do this, we must first prove an upper bound on the expected payoff to the row player in (x b , j ′ ), which we do in the following lemma. Here we first prove that most of the probability mass of x b is placed on rows i in which C ij ′ > 1 3 + z, which when combined with the fact that there is no i ∈ supp(x * ) such that (i, j ′ ) is a pure ( 2 3 − z)-WSNE, is sufficient to provide an upper bound.
Proof. We begin by proving an upper bound on the amount of probability mass assigned by x b to rows i with C ij ′ < 1 3 + z. Let T = 1 − C ij ′ be a random variable where the row i is sampled according to x b . Lemma 12 implies that:
.
Observe that Pr(T ≥ 1 − ( So, if p = 9z (1+3z)(2/3−z) then we know that at least 1−p probability is assigned by x b to rows i such that C ij ′ > 1 3 + z. Since we have assumed that there is no i ∈ supp(x * ) such that (i, j ′ ) is a pure ( 
Finally, we show that the expected payoff to the row player in the profile (x s , j ′ ) is close to 1. Here we use the fact that x * is a min-max strategy along with the bound from Lemma 13 to prove our lower bound.
Lemma 14.
We have (x s T · R) j ′ > 1−15z 1+3z . Proof. Since x * is a min-max strategy that secures a value strictly larger than 2 3 − z, we have:
Substituting the bounds from Lemmas 8, 9, and 13 then gives:
Solving for (x s T · R) j ′ then yields the desired result.
⊓ ⊔
Finding rows b and u. So far, we have shown that the expected payoff to the row player in (x b , j * ) is close to 1, and that the expected payoff to the column player in (x b , j ′ ) is close to 1. We now show that there exists a row b ∈ B such that R bj * is close to 1, and C bj ′ is close to 1, and that there exists a row s ∈ S in which C sj * and R sj ′ are both close to 1. The following lemma uses Markov's inequality to show a pair of probability bounds that will be critical in showing the existence of b.
Lemma 15. We have: -x b assigns strictly more than 0.5 probability to rows i with R ij * > 1 − 18z 1+3z . -x b assigns strictly more than 0.5 probability to rows i with C ij ′ > 1 − 18z 1+3z . Proof. We begin with the first case. Consider the random variable T = 1 − R ij * where i is sampled from x b . By Lemma 10, we have that:
We have that T ≥ 18z 1+3z whenever R ij * ≤ 1 − 18z 1+3z , so we can apply Markov's inequality to obtain: Pr(T ≥ 18z 1 + 3z ) < 9z 1+3z 18z 1+3z = 0.5.
The proof of the second case is identical to the proof given above, but uses the (identical) bound from Lemma 12.
⊓ ⊔
The next lemma uses the same techniques to prove a pair of probability bounds that will be used to prove the existence of s.
Lemma 16. We have:
-x s assigns strictly more than 1 3 probability to rows i with C ij * > 1 − 27z 1+3z . -x s assigns strictly more than 2 3 probability to rows i with R ij ′ > 1 − 27z 1+3z . Proof. We begin with the first claim. Consider the random variable T = 1 − C ij * where i is sampled from x s . By Lemma 11, we have that:
We have that T ≥ 27z 1+3z whenever C ij * ≤ 1 − 27z 1+3z , so we can apply Markov's inequality to obtain: Pr(T ≥ 27z 1 + 3z ) < 9z 1+3z 27z 1+3z = 1 3 .
We now move on to the second claim. Consider the random variable T = 1 − R ij * where i is sampled from x b . By Lemma 14, we have that:
We have that T ≥ 27z 1+3z whenever R ij * ≤ 1 − 27z 1+3z , so we can apply Markov's inequality to obtain: Pr(T ≥ 27z 1 + 3z ) < 18z 1+3z 27z 1+3z = 2 3 .
⊓ ⊔
Finally, we can formally prove the existence of b and s, which completes the proof of correctness for our algorithm.
Proof (of Lemma 4). We begin by proving the first claim. If we sample a row b randomly from x b , then Lemma 15 implies that probability that R bj * ≤ 1 − 18z 1+3z is strictly less than 0.5 and that the probability that C bj ′ ≤ 1 − 18z 1+3z is strictly less than 0.5. Hence, by the union bound, the probability that at least one of these events occurs is strictly less than 1. So, there is a positive probability that neither of the events occurs, which implies that there exists at least one row b that satisfies the desired properties.
The second claim is proved using exactly the same technique, but using the bounds from Lemma 16, again observing that the probability that a randomly sampled row from x s satisfies the desired properties with positive probability.
This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
